Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Truth Predicate: the truth predicate of a language is the "is true" expressed in this language. Its allowance can be empirically justified or attributed to the statement on the basis of the logical form. According to the redundancy theory, the truth-predicate is fundamentally superfluous. According to W.V.O. Quine (Quine, Philosophie der Logik, 2005, p. 33), the truth predicate is merely used for generalization. For example, all sentences of a particular form are true. A language containing its own truth-predicate is semantically closed. In such a language, semantic paradoxes are possible. See also expressiveness, circularity, semantic closeness, truth, truth definition, redundancy theory, self-reference, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Crispin Wright on Truth Predicate - Dictionary of Arguments
I 29f Truth predicate/Wright: two characteristics are necessary: 1. prescriptive and descriptive norm, determined by practice. Definition descriptive normative (predicate): then if the choice of a move through doers is actually guided in that they follow the judgment or not. Definition prescriptive normative: if the choice within the practice must be guided in this way. Definition Deflationism: the T-predicate is with respect to any assertoric (assertive) practice of positive regulatory nature, both prescriptive and descriptive. >Truth predicate. Prescriptive: every reason to think that a sentence is T, can be made a reason to state this sentence. Descriptive: the practice exactly looks as if it would look like when the assertoric moves would be deliberately chosen. >Assertibility/Wright. I 32 The distinction between legitimate and illegitimate moves must be confirmed by the actual assertoric practice. >Practise. I 55 Tractatus/Wittgenstein: object and proposition are formal concepts. >Tractatus, >Proposition, >Objects. I 56 Minimalism: Wittgenstein's proposal causes that each predicate that has certain very general characteristics, is qualified as a truth predicate. This also works for pluralism. >Minimalism/Wright. I 180 Content/Wright: must comply with discipline and surface syntax (for example, conditional, negation) of a discourse. The so secured content is enough to qualify a truth predicate (by platitudes). >Content/Wright. I 221f Definition truth predicate/Wright: a predicate that is enough for a small amount of basal principles (platitudes among other things on assertion and negation). >Assertions, >Negation. These characteristic features are the only ones which are essential for truth. However, they are not sufficient to motivate an intuitive realism regarding a discourse. >Discourse. >Realism, >Sufficiency._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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> Counter arguments against Wright
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth Predicate
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29